Nicolás is out in the rain, and it pours

The regime has lost the electoral majority for quite some time now, but most remarkably is the political wreck the "Maduro Administration," as some patronizingly call it, appears to be in. Opinion polls show its catastrophic sinking. It is not some flighty popularity contest, but something deeper, denser, and more calamitous: the demise of a project that has stretched and overstretched, and finally blown to bits by corruption. All the alcohol in the world and all the formaldehyde cannot disinfect or preserve it.

The latest opinion polls conducted by polling companies working for the government, for the opposition, or for both, show similar results: Nicolás Maduro is not up to the task, the government is bursting apart, and support is slipping away. Interestingly, what the polls show is not dissatisfaction by the "majority half" vs. the red "minority half," but that to a certain point political polarization has been overcome and a whole country is opposing a regime that just cannot hit the nail on the head, that always makes the wrong decisions and that gloats over its failure. Chavistas have come to a simple conclusion, so obvious that it was overlooked entirely: Nicolás is not Chávez. Not that the latter has done any useful work, but because he was able to disguise his shipwrecks making them look like adventure tours in the Sargasso Sea.

The government's public opinion cataclysm is hardly reversible. It might though, because nothing is impossible, but the odds are heavily against it. When Nicolás speaks he shows no good judgment, when he goes quiet he shows no discretion. Nothing he does can be acknowledged as positive. He will not stop insulting. He stopped being Maduro in the attempt to become Chávez, but froze half way through, becoming a mix of the barons of "el proceso": speaker of parliament Diosdado Cabello, Minister of Petroleum and Mining and Pdvsa's Executive Director Rafael Ramírez, and PSUV Deputy Pedro Carreño, with a pinch of former Planning and Finance Minister Jorge Giordani. Nicolás fell into the expert clutches of Chavismo wholesalers. He can neither move toward the proletarian fantasy (and he is reproached for that), nor move back as any pragmatic shipwrecked person would (he is not allowed to). Neither does he know where the north is, nor where the sun rises. He has lost that charming ignorance he used to have slung across his chest, replacing it with Bourbon inability either to learn or to forget.

FEW OPTIONS. Facing disaster, desperate crazy ideas abound: relaunching the presidential assassination theory, making a few forays into the sins of the ancient regime, and arguing that the opposition has the ability to sabotage the national electrical system. The regime's propagandists do not seem to notice that these propositions imply, respectively, that the country is so insecure that Nicolás is scared, that the last government was Chávez's, and that the seeds of doom were planted back then (nobody remembers the so-called "Fourth Republic" anymore), and, finally, that if the opposition has the muscle to turn out the light, then it has the power to turn out the government too. This is a lot of nonsense talked out of despair.

The government's options facing this situation are dramatic. It cannot be ruled out a priori that it might have a miracle solution up its sleeve, like the distribution of more bread loaves made possible by increased oil revenues from the crisis in Syria. However, if the current situation is projected, we have to admit that the reds do not have a political-electoral majority; the possibility of losing the election again is higher; and on the assumption that the opposition wins the election, provided there is no electoral fraud, the obvious move is that both disappointed Chavistas and democrats will request Maduro's resignation, or that, flooded with a tsunami of requests, a constituent assembly is convened that would call for a new presidential election.

The government is aware of this. It is the Chavistas themselves -who blame Madurismo for the current crisis- that would request a new presidential election to try their luck on unsinkable Diosdado Cabello, or any of the other wannabes, like Táchira state Governor José Gregorio Vielma Mora, Rafael Ramírez, or Interior and Justice Minister Miguel Rodríguez Torres, with whom Ramírez campaigns on a daily basis.
In light of this scenario -considered to be unacceptable by Nicolás and his close associates- the other two remaining options would be electoral fraud on an unprecedented massive scale, or calling the election off. Both would lead to a crisis that seems to lack viable institutional channels.

But time might be in short supply given the situation facing the country. It is months since the government expects a major social outburst, and it must have way more information than is available through the stifled media. But in the streets the beat of anger is felt, the ordinary citizen is on edge.

THE OPPOSITION. For the time being the opposition is focused on the upcoming election. A visible unity of political parties has been forged, although some issues remain that could be tackled with more talent and less arrogance. There is a conspicuous absence, however, of a political direction committed to seizing power away from Maduro. No one is going to snatch power from him; it might just slip through his fingers, out of so much handling and wasting. It looks as if any time soon power will lie spilled all over the street, without those who used to hold it being able to keep it, or hard-line oppositionists even considering picking it up off the floor.

That being so, it is not to be ruled out a government's attempt at turning the tables by means of repression, or through an audacious alliance initiative. Repression, however, has its limits, while alliances require policy changes, something Nicolas has been unable to do (even if he has said he wants to) on account of his being a hostage of his left wing. The near future will swing between the oil price and social outcry. Not to mention that the panting breath of growing civil-military discontentment can be heard over the appeasement policy of the government vis-à-vis Guyana, both on the Venezuela's claim to the Essequibo region and its right to sovereignty and jurisdiction in the Atlantic Façade.

Calling for a new presidential election as a means to redress the consequences of fraud and to gradually reestablish democracy becomes the overriding objective of the democratic players. It is a peaceful and constitutional solution to the present crisis, which would be reached by means of a constituent assembly, or thanks to Nicolas' generous collaboration to move towards transition, should he kindly hand in his resignation. It does not seem possible to prolong the status quo for as much as six years. By the way, a new election will be a way for Chavistas to freely choose their presidential candidate, something their late leader denied them.

Translated by Sancho Araujohttp://english.eluniversal.com/opinion/130914/carlos-blancos-a-time-to-talk-of-september-8